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§ 13.01 Introduction1
Long before there were limited liability companies (LLCs), there
2
were mining joint ventures. Although LLCs have generally become the dominant choice for the formation of privately held enti3
ties, the common law joint venture stubbornly persists as the
preferred investment vehicle for mining companies.4 The practitioner faced with advising its mining clients regarding choice of
business structure has a plethora of “Form 5” options previously
published by the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation
(Foundation): Form 5,5 Form 5A,6 or Form 5A LLC,7 each with its
benefits and costs, virtues and shortcomings.
To provide even more confusion, the authors propose yet another version of Form 5, that the authors have dubbed the “Modest
1
The authors wish to thank Lauren King, a summer associate with Holme Roberts &
Owen LLP, for her assistance, as well as the other colleagues whom we consulted in
developing this chapter.
2
The first limited liability company statute was adopted in Wyoming in 1977. See
Susan Pace Hamill, “The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company,” 59 Ohio St.
L.J. 1459 (1998), for a history of the LLC. Mining joint ventures and joint operating
agreements have been a staple of the proceedings of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Foundation since at least 1956. See, e.g., Dale H. Flagg, “Tax Treatment of Joint Operations,” 2 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 247 (1956). The history of the mining joint venture is
summarized in John C. Lacy, “Alternate Ways of Paying the Piper: Dilution and
Nonconsent Mechanisms in Mining Venture Agreements,” 31 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 71, §§ 7.02, 7.03[4] (1985).
3
The total number of Delaware LLCs formed in 2005 exceeded the number of Delaware corporations formed in that same year. See Larry E. Ribstein & Robert R.
Keatinge, Ribstein and Keatinge on Limited Liability Companies § 1:1 n.1 (2d ed.
Supp. 2006) (citing the annual reports of the Delaware Secretary of State to the International Association of Corporate Administrators).
4
See James F. Cress & Douglas P. Wall, “Domestic and International Uranium Ventures and LLCs,” Uranium Exploration and Development 10-1, 10-4 & 10-5 (Rocky Mt.
Min. L. Fdn. 2006) [hereinafter Uranium JV Paper]. This chapter results from a comment in the Uranium JV Paper stating that “the Foundation could enhance the LLC
options available for mining ventures without too much trouble . . . by publishing a limited liability company form based on Form 5.” Id. at 5. One of the authors now disavows the “without too much trouble” portion of that comment.
5
Model Form 5: Mining Venture Agreement (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 1984) [hereinafter Form 5].
6
Model Form 5A: Exploration, Development and Mine Operating Agreement (Rocky
Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 1996) [hereinafter Form 5A].
7
Model Form 5A LLC: Exploration, Development and Mining Limited Liability Company (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 1998) [hereinafter Form 5A LLC].
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Form” in the vain hope that the project would thereby become
more manageable. The Modest Form is intended as a less complex
LLC agreement based primarily on Form 5, incorporating certain
provisions from Form 5A and Form 5A LLC, as well as new provisions based on amendments to the Delaware Limited Liability
Company Act (DLLCA)8 since the adoption of Form 5A LLC and
other recent LLC legal developments. The authors have provided
a first draft of the Modest Form for review and comment by users
of the previous forms.9
Naturally, the terms of the Modest Form significantly drive the
content of this chapter. Similar to the challenges faced by the authors who transformed Form 5A into Form 5A LLC,10 certain revisions to Form 5 were necessary in drafting the Modest Form to
recognize the existence of an entity separate from its owners and
to incorporate common conventions in the drafting of LLC agreements. Those changes include, for example, that title to property
is held in the name of the LLC instead of its owners, and that
owners have “Percentage Interests” in the entity rather than
“Participating Interests” in the assets. This chapter, however,
largely does not discuss those concepts because they are noncontroversial and now familiar to many practitioners, and were
11
covered comprehensively by the authors of Form 5A LLC.
Instead, we reconsider the structure of Form 5A and certain
provisions of Form 5A LLC a decade after their publication and
suggest some issues that may pose obstacles to their wider use.
Departing to a limited extent from the original “Modest Proposal”
of an LLC based solely on Form 5, we also consider certain provisions of Form 5A LLC that may be sufficiently beneficial in an
LLC agreement to be included in the Modest Form, based on our
admittedly untested assessment of their general acceptance or

8
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1109 (elec. 2007).
9
The draft Modest Form is not appended to this chapter due to space limitations in
the Annual Institute Proceedings, but is available as a free download from the Foundation’s web site, http://www.rmmlf.org, or directly from the authors.
10
See Ronald K. Edquist & Randall E. Hubbard, “The New Form 5A LLC: Implementation of Form 5A in the LLC Context,” 44 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 13-1 (1998).
11
See id.
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usefulness.12 We then discuss some “new” provisions proposed in
the Modest Form based on recent legal developments. Before concluding, we briefly touch on a few dispute resolution matters and
the tax exhibit that accompanies the Modest Form.
We begin with a summary of the various forms and their history, and the philosophy behind their construction, before launching
into the substance of the Modest Form.
§ 13.02 Background
[1] Form 5 and the Joint Venture
Form 5 is a model joint venture agreement for a common law
joint venture contemplating that “one party (described as “XCO”)
owns a mineral property and is offering a 50% undivided interest
in the property to a second party (described as “YCO”) in exchange for YCO’s agreement to fund a stated amount of explora13
tion, development and/or mining costs.” As stated in the General Comments to Form 5, “[a]lthough it is certainly possible, and
may be preferable in many situations, to create a state law partnership, mining venture agreements have traditionally avoided
14
this approach and the Model Form follows this tradition.”
A joint venture may be carried out through a variety of structures.15 Although many business associations that are not statu16
torily created entities will be deemed general partnerships, in
12
For expediency in comparing the business terms of Form 5 to Form 5A and
Form 5A LLC, whenever the terms of Form 5A and Form 5A LLC are the same, the
authors will refer in this chapter only to Form 5A LLC.
13
See Form 5, General Comments at 1.
14
Id. General Comments art. IV, at 6-7.
15
See, e.g., Joint Venture Task Force of the Negotiated Acquisitions Comm. of the
Am. Bar Ass’n, Model Joint Venture Agreement With Commentary (2006) [hereinafter
the ABA Model Joint Venture Agreement]. The ABA Model Joint Venture Agreement is
actually a limited liability company agreement for a Delaware limited liability company. In the preface, committee Co-Chairs Thomas B. Hyman, Jr. and Alison J. Youngman state that the choice of a Delaware limited liability company “reflects first, the
widespread use of limited liability companies and, second, the frequent use of Delaware
as the jurisdiction of formation, even though the Delaware LLC statute is not based on
the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act.”
16
See Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 15-202(a)
(elec. 2007) (“[T]he association of two or more persons (i) to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to form a
partnership. . . .”).
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numerous contexts, courts and commentators have recognized the
existence of the common law joint venture,17 commonly described
as “an enterprise undertaken by several persons jointly to engage
in a common plan or project for their mutual benefit with a sharing of capital, skill and effort.”18 The primary disadvantage of a
common law joint venture or partnership is that the parties are
subject to unlimited liability for the joint venture’s obligations.19
The primary advantages of the common law joint venture business structure are the flexibility for constructing the contractual
relationship, and the ability to avoid partnership tax treatment in
the very limited circumstances where avoiding such tax treatment is desired.20 Under Form 5, the joint venture is managed by
a management committee, and the day-to-day operations are
managed by a manager.21
[2] Interlude: Form 5A
Roughly a decade after its publication, Form 5 suffered the inevitable fate of revision with the publication of Form 5A in 1996. In
his 1990 paper, David Johnson wrote that “[w]hile the status attained by Form 5 has to be deemed complimentary to the efforts
of the [Foundation], the ensuing use of Form 5 is clearly inconsistent with the intent of its authors. Consequently, there is in
practice an increasing clamor for revisions to Form 5 or a sequel
to Form 5 designed to better accommodate the prevailing use of
22
the document.” The “intent” referred to by Johnson was that
Form 5 be used as a checklist and not as a form contract.23 The
problem, urged Johnson and the Form 5A Commentary, was that
complex issues regarding development and production that were
17
See generally Stephen I. Glover & Craig M. Wasserman, Partnerships, Joint Ventures & Strategic Alliances § 5.03 (rev. ed. 2006).
18
Pike v. Commodore Motor Corp., No. 940, 1985 WL 11564, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 10,
1985).
19
See Glover & Wasserman, supra note 17, § 6.02[2].
20
John R. Maxfield, Davis O. O’Connor & Risa L. Wolf, “New Oil and Gas Exploration Investment Vehicle: The Limited Liability Company,” 38 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst.
17-1, §§ 17.01, 17.03[1][e][ii] (1992).
21
See Form 5, arts. VII, VIII.
22
David Stafford Johnson, “Form 5 Mining Venture Agreement: The Sequel?,” 36
Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 10-1, 10-5 (1990).
23
See Form 5A, Commentary art. I.B.
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not addressed in Form 5 arose during negotiations, leading to inevitable disagreements.24
Accordingly, Form 5A was born, revising Form 5 to (1) allocate
and limit responsibility for preexisting environmental problems
and provide for the funding of an environmental compliance fund;
(2) require pre-feasibility, feasibility, and development programs
and budgets before proceeding from the exploration to the development phase of a project; (3) provide that indirect transfers of interests trigger preemptive rights; (4) reflect a new approach to
post-payout dilution; (5) obligate the participants to pledge and
subordinate their interests in the context of project financing;
(6) expand the duties imposed upon the manager; and (7) expand
25
the rights and remedies of non-defaulting participants.
[3] Form 5A LLC and the Dawn of the Limited
Liability Company
Form 5A LLC, the next and current iteration of Form 5, revised
the entire relationship of the parties for the purpose of limiting
the liability of the participants. Although the first LLC statute
26
was adopted in Wyoming in 1977, it wasn’t until 1988, when the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruled that an LLC could be taxed
27
as a partnership that states widely began adopting LLC stat28
utes. After the IRS adopted its “check-the-box” regulations in
1996, eliminating the need to analyze whether certain corporate
29
characteristics were absent for partnership tax treatment, the
LLC began its ascent as the entity of choice for private joint ven30
tures generally. Form 5A LLC was published in 1998, in recognition that the LLC had become an important entity choice for
mining companies after the issuance of the check-the-box regula-

24
See Form 5A, Commentary art. I.A; see also John F. Welborn & Sasha A. Karpov,
“Addressing the Conflicting Concerns of Participants in a Mining Project,” Mining
Agreements III 7-1 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 1991).
25
See Form 5A, Commentary art. II.
26
See Hamill, supra note 2.
27
Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
28
Edquist & Hubbard, supra note 10, §§ 13.01, 13.02[2].
29
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (elec. 2007).
30
See supra notes 3, 15, and accompanying text.
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tions.31 The intent of Form 5A LLC was to follow Form 5A as
closely as possible,32 although Form 5A LLC was bifurcated into a
Members’ Agreement33 and an Operating Agreement34 for reasons discussed below.
§ 13.03 The Proposal: In Defense of the Modest Form
The Modest Form is offered to (1) posit that the less complex
Form 5 is still widely used and may still be more accepted as a
starting point for joint venture negotiation than Form 5A LLC;
(2) contend that, notwithstanding Form 5’s continuing popularity,
the LLC offers significant advantages over the unincorporated
joint venture; (3) assert that Form 5A LLC is underused despite
the superiority of the LLC as a mining investment vehicle; and
(4) prompt the Foundation to consider the formation of a committee to undertake the drafting of a completely new LLC agreement
for mining ventures.
Admittedly, the perception that Form 5 is more widely used
than Form 5A LLC is based entirely on the personal experience of
the authors and a completely unscientific poll of other practitioners in the mining area. That perception also ignores the reality
that many mining venture draftspersons likely borrow elements
from both Form 5 and Form 5A LLC, as well as other venture
agreement models; and that certain elements of Form 5A LLC
contain highly desirable refinements to Form 5 that will be discussed in more detail below.
Assuming that the parties desire partnership tax treatment, because of the ability of the parties to limit their personal liability,
the LLC is a superior investment vehicle to the joint venture.
Consider, for example, that, of the four disadvantages of the LLC
entity form listed by Edquist and Hubbard, i.e., (1) lack of familiarity, (2) lack of judicial precedent, (3) transaction costs, and
(4) that the parties may not desire partnership tax treatment,35
31
Edquist & Hubbard, supra note 10, § 13.01.
32
See id. § 13.03[2].
33
Form 5A LLC, Part I, Members’ Agreement [hereinafter Form 5A LLC Members’
Agreement or Members’ Agreement].
34
Form 5A LLC, Part II, Operating Agreement [hereinafter Form 5A LLC Operating
Agreement or Operating Agreement].
35
Edquist & Hubbard, supra note 10, at § 13.07.
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all but the fourth disadvantage have been solved with the passage
of time. Regarding familiarity, although mining companies may
be among the last to embrace the LLC structure, there is no
shortage of practitioners who know much more about LLCs than
the authors.36 With respect to judicial precedent, as more LLCs
have been formed, more cases have been tried and reported, and
it has become increasingly clear that, faced with a case of first
impression in the LLC context, the Delaware courts will look to
Delaware corporate or limited partnership law to arrive at a prac37
tical answer. As to transaction costs, those have decreased proportionately with the increase in the familiarity of practitioners
with the LLC form of entity and judicial construction of the entity
(ignoring corporate registered agent and filing fees that are usually nominal in relation to the cost of a mining venture).
Finally, notwithstanding that this chapter is accompanied by a
full-blown draft form, the authors are not so reckless as to actually recommend that anyone use the Modest Form in practice.
Much has been made in past papers38 of the warning statement
on the cover of Form 5 that it is “not intended to be taken from
the shelf and executed as is.”39 The warning statement on the
cover page of the draft Modest Form goes a step further, recognizing that the Modest Form has not been subjected to peer review,
and should be compared to actual forms previously published by
the Foundation. Better yet, the Foundation should consider constituting a new committee to transform the draft Modest Form into an actual, peer-reviewed, Foundation-endorsed Form 5 LLC,
taking the best from each of the prior forms, considering changes
in the law governing LLCs, and utilizing the more advanced familiarity of practitioners with the LLC form of entity.

36
See, e.g., Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 3.
37
See DLLCA, Del. Code Ann. Tit. 6, § 18-1104 (elec. 2007) (“In any case not provided for in this chapter, the rules of law and equity, including the law merchant, shall
gov-ern.”). See also Louis G. Hering & David A. Harris, “2006 Cumulative Survey of
Delaware Case Law Relating to Alternative Entities,” § III, in 2006 ABA Annual Meeting (2006) (noting that a number of significant cases involving LLCs have been decided
by the Delaware courts and that many provisions of the DLLCA are based on comparable provisions of the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act).
38
See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 22, § 10.01, at 10-3.
39
Form 5, cover page.
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§ 13.04 Reconsidering Form 5A LLC: “Ten Years Gone”
[1] The Philosophy of the Form
[a] The Myth of the 50/50 Deal
As noted above, Form 5, Form 5A, and Form 5A LLC are each
intended as a starting point for a 50/50 deal.40 Unfortunately, the
50/50 deal is the most complicated deal to draft. Many of the provisions added to Form 5 in Form 5A LLC and its predecessor
Form 5A were to insure that each 50% venture partner, including
the non-managing venture partner, has detailed and specific
41
rights to oversee the operation of the venture. In a 50/50 deal,
the significant investment of the non-managing venture partner
likely justifies such complicated provisions.
In the experience of the authors, however, most deals are not
50/50 deals.42 YCO often has the right to earn a greater than 50%
interest (sometimes by a series of options to earn a greater Participating Interest after completion of its Initial Contribution). One
party or the other may have superior funding ability, technical
expertise, and superior negotiating power in determining the
terms of the governing documents. With greater control and
greater negotiating power concentrated in one party comes greater simplicity, because the non-controlling owner is unable to negotiate complicated rights to manage, monitor, or block activities of
the venture (and based on transaction economics, may not be entitled to such rights). The non-controlling owner must rely on the
protection of risk allocation, i.e., that the majority owner has the
greater financial interest at stake and thus the incentive to make
management decisions that maximize the wealth of the venture
as a whole.

40
See Form 5, General Comments; Form 5A, Commentary art. I.D.; Edquist & Hubbard, supra note 10, § 13.03[2].
41
For example, Form 5A substantially expanded the provisions dealing with development, to include “Pre-Feasibility Studies,” “Feasibility Studies,” and a multi-staged
approach to decision-making related to Development. See Form 5A, Commentary art.
IX.
42
The ABA Model Joint Venture Agreement assumes a 60/40 deal, with “Large
Member,” a $1 billion company, owning 60%, and “Small Member,” a $100 million company, owning 40%. See ABA Model Joint Venture Agreement at xvi.
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The “myth” of the 50/50 deal masks the more complex majority/minority reality in many deals, which reality has remained an
underlying tension in the development of the forms. The “intent”
problem then becomes one of philosophy, i.e., whether a form document should be drafted like a statute to protect the interests of
the party that has lesser negotiating power, or should be drafted
like a restatement, to reflect what is agreed in the greatest number of transactions (or would be if all alternatives are available).
[b] The Hybrid Approach
The best answer may be a hybrid approach of providing a simple form with more complicated provisions attached as alternatives to be incorporated into the body of the form when appropriate. It may be easier for the practitioner and the mining company
faced with the need to quickly document a new transaction to
begin their drafting exercise with a simpler framework, and to incorporate desired provisions appropriate for the business deal,
rather than to begin with difficult provisions that may overwhelm
a reader who is less experienced or pressed for time, and thus
less patient.
The Modest Form is intended to be a less complex alternative to
Form 5A LLC for a mining venture, based on the Form 5 structure, with the philosophy that more complicated, controversial, or
frequently negotiated provisions should be eliminated from the
base form and attached as alternative provisions available for inclusion if desired. The authors have included only a few alternative provisions, but recommend that the Form 5 committee review
as possible alternative provisions all of the Form 5A provisions
and other concepts that frequently recur in mining venture negotiations, such as feasibility study options, carried interests, nonconsent provisions, and separate project areas for large properties.
The following subsections describe three examples of such
choices made in developing the Modest Form.
Example 1: Feasibility Studies and Development. As noted in
the Uranium JV Paper, Form 5A LLC contains detailed provisions regarding “Pre-Feasibility Studies,” “Feasibility Studies,”
“Development Budgets,” “Feasibility Contractors,” and “Approved
Alternatives,” with at least five Management Committee decision
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points in the process to determine whether to move into development.43 These provisions were controversial and debated at
length in the development of Form 5, in part because they may
increase the potential for deadlock.44 Those provisions have not
been included in the Modest Form, and represent the most substantial example of provisions that may be more appropriate as
alternate provisions in a hybrid approach. For example, prefeasibility studies and feasibility studies are often funded by the
grant of a second option to YCO to earn an additional interest in
the project, and may contain requirements specific to the mining
property or mineral that is the subject of the joint venture. Other
transactions employ “carried interest” options to assist XCO in
funding its share of development expenses, in return for which
YCO might demand greater control over the content and timing of
pre-feasibility, feasibility study, and development operations. Different feasibility study and development options would be valuable additions as alternate provisions in any new form.
Example 2: Defaults and Dilution. The default provisions in
Form 5A LLC appear in sections 11.4 and 11.5 of the Operating
Agreement. They are similar to those included in Form 5,45 except
that the dilution multiple, and in some cases whether the dilution
is at all punitive, depends on whether payout has occurred and on
the use of the funds subject to the applicable capital call. Form 5A
LLC also contains a remedy that allows the non-defaulting member to purchase the interest of the defaulting member for a to-bespecified percentage of its fair market value (as determined pursuant to an appraisal procedure).46 The added buyout right is in
addition to a provision carried over substantially from section 6.4(b) of Form 5 that requires a defaulting member to relinquish, at the election of the non-defaulting member, its membership interest for an amount, payable out of net proceeds, equal to
47
its previous capital contributions. In other words, Form 5A LLC
43
See Uranium JV Paper, supra note 4, at 10-8 & 10-9.
44
This is the perception of one of the authors, who served on the editorial committee
for Form 5A and reviewed several proposals that led to the final form of these provisions.
45
See Form 5 § 6.4.
46
Form 5A LLC, Operating Agreement § 11.5(c).
47
See id. § 11.5(b)(ii).
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contains two distinct buyout rights in the same default provision.48 The contribution default provisions in Form 5A LLC may
be appropriate for a particular agreement of the parties, but seem
rather complicated for a form and may be another example of
provisions that are more appropriate as alternate provisions.
Example 3: Confidential Information. Form 5A LLC contains
numerous refinements in the protection of confidential information developed with the input of the Foundation’s Form 7 (Con49
fidentiality and Nondisclosure Agreement) Committee. Conceptually, the revisions differentiate between “Business Information”
developed under the LLC Agreement and “Member Information”
that a member develops independent of the LLC and voluntarily
uses or discloses in connection with performance of its obligations
under the LLC Agreement. The use, ownership, and disclosure of
Business Information and Member Information are subject to different restrictions under Article XIII. In general, both members
own and may freely use Business Information for any purpose
(whether or not related to the Business), subject to certain confidentiality obligations. Member Information, however, is owned
solely by the member that originally developed that information,
and may only be used by the other member in the context of the
Business. Generally, Member Information can only be disclosed
by the non-owning member if compelled by law.
While useful for joint ventures where one party contributes proprietary technology, such as bioleaching, or in ventures between
parties owning adjoining mines and mining facilities, the distinctions between “Member Information” and “Business Information”
may be more complex than necessary for many ventures. Also,
several of the provisions may be controversial. For example, any
enhancements, improvements, or refinements of “Member Information” developed by either member in the context of the Business are not jointly owned, but would be owned by the member
48
The additional buyout right applies only if a member has covered the defaulted
capital contribution. The obligation to relinquish a member’s interest applies whether
or not a cover payment is made, but only in the case of contributions for a program and
budget covering development or mining (i.e., excluding programs and budgets covering
feasibility, pre-feasibility, and the like in which case the defaulting member’s interest
may be reduced but not relinquished). See id. § 11.5.
49
These provisions are found in Form 5A LLC Operating Agreement art. XIII.
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that originally developed the Member Information. Also, because
it is jointly owned, either member may disclose confidential Business Information in connection with an independent business
venture.
In light of the foregoing, the Modest Form adopts some of the
confidentiality definitions, but would treat the more complex
Form 5A LLC confidentiality concepts as alternative provisions.
[2] Form 5A LLC’s Two-Agreement Complexity
[a] The Concern: Claims by Third Parties
As noted above, Form 5A LLC is divided into a Members’
Agreement and an Operating Agreement with the stated purpose
of maximizing the limited liability feature of the LLC entity.50 As
summarized by Edquist & Hubbard, the concern is that the LLC
itself might enforce the contribution, indemnification, and continuing liability provisions against the members and, if the LLC
could enforce those obligations, so might the creditors or a bank51
ruptcy trustee of the LLC.
Those concerns are bolstered by a
section of the DLLCA providing that a creditor may enforce the
obligation of a member to contribute capital to an LLC to the extent the creditor reasonably relied on the contribution obligation
in extending the credit, and further provided that the LLC
50
Edquist & Hubbard, supra note 10, §§ 13.04[1] & [2].
51
Id. §§ 13.03[2], 13.04. In addition to the liability issues discussed herein,
Edquist & Hubbard accurately predicted, see id. § 13.06[5], that veil-piercing concepts
would be applied to LLCs. See e.g., Thomas v. Hobbs, No. 04C-02-010 RFS, 2006 WL
1653947 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2005). Traditional veil piercing involves an action by
a creditor to impose personal liability on a member for obligations of the LLC. See id. at
*3-4. The limitation of liability objectives that formed the basis for separating Form 5A
LLC into two agreements are not implicated by traditional veil piercing because the
Form 5A LLC Members’ Agreement concerns obligations of the members, not the LLC.
The concept of reverse veil piercing, i.e., an action by a creditor to impose liability on a
LLC for personal obligations of a member, has also been applied in the LLC context,
notably where a member attempts to insulate assets to avoid creditors. See, e.g., Great
Neck Plaza, L.P. v. Le Peep Restaurants, LLC, 37 P.3d 485 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). Reverse veil piercing could be a significant concern of one member with respect to the liabilities of the other member. But see DLLCA, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-703(a), (d)
(elec. 2007) (providing that a charging order granting rights to receive distributions to
which a member would otherwise be entitled to a judgment creditor is the exclusive
remedy by which the judgment creditor may satisfy a judgment out of the judgment
debtor’s LLC interest). Notwithstanding the foregoing, there likely are situations involving extreme circumstances where a Delaware court might be willing to apply principles of reverse veil piercing to avoid such an exclusive remedy provision.
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agreement reflected the contribution obligation at the time the
credit was extended.52 The rationale of Form 5A LLC is that separating those obligations into a separate Members’ Agreement
removes the ability of the LLC and the LLC’s creditors to enforce
those obligations against the members.
[b] The Problem
The approach of separating Form 5A LLC into two agreements
had an undesirable side effect. Users of Form 5 had grown accustomed to the organization of that document, which allowed for detailed review of more frequently negotiated provisions and more
cursory review of “boilerplate.” Form 5’s familiar organization was
somewhat revised in Form 5A, and had to be further disrupted in
Form 5A LLC in order to segregate into the Members’ Agreement
the obligations that might be asserted against a member by the
LLC, its creditors, or a bankruptcy trustee. Over time, this disruption has proven to be potentially off-putting to those familiar
with Form 5 and to users who deal regularly with LLCs (or for
that matter, mining joint ventures), who generally are accustomed to a single agreement incorporating all of the operative
provisions in a more or less customary progression.
More importantly, time has shown that separating the governing documents into two agreements likely does not accomplish the
objective of preventing the Members’ Agreement from being en53
forced as an LLC agreement. At the time Form 5A LLC was
drafted, the DLLCA defined the “limited liability company
agreement” in relevant part as “any agreement, written or oral, of
the member or members as to the affairs of a limited liability
54
company and the conduct of its business.” The current provision
also provides that a “limited liability company is bound by its
limited liability company agreement whether or not the limited
liability company executes the limited liability company agree52
DLLCA, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-502(b) (elec. 2007).
53
The authors have great respect for the authors of Form 5A LLC and recognize
that the approach of dividing Form 5A LLC was very innovative at the time and based
on substantive concerns under the then-recently-overhauled DLLCA, for which there
was little precedent. It is, of course, easier to critique an idea with the hindsight of additional law and experience than it is to generate the idea to address the concerns
raised by a recently-amended and thinly-construed statute.
54
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (1997) (amended 1999, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2007).
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ment.”55 By defining the LLC agreement as “any agreement,” the
statute left unanswered (and continues to leave unanswered) the
question as to whether “any” is used in the plural or singular to
mean one single agreement or multiple agreements entered into
among the members.56 Agreements other than the document titled “Operating Agreement” or “Limited Liability Company
Agreement” might also be held to constitute the LLC agreement,
especially because it is clear that the company need not execute
“any” such agreement.
Ribstein & Keatinge state that an LLC agreement could exist in
57
more than one document, as some partnership cases have held.
In addition, the title of the agreement has been shown to be irrelevant to the statutory definition of “limited liability company.”
The 2001 amendment (one of five such amendments to such defi58
nition since the statute’s enactment) modified the definition to
make clear that an LLC agreement may be referred to as “a limited liability company agreement, operating agreement or otherwise.”59
Because an LLC agreement need not actually be referred to as
an LLC Agreement (or in the case of Form 5A LLC, as an Operating Agreement), and because the Members’ Agreement and Operating Agreement both deal with the exploration and development
of the same mining property, a court likely would conclude that
the Members’ Agreement and the Operating Agreement should be
55
DLLCA, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (elec. 2007).
56
Webster’s defines the adjective “any” in part as “one, some, or all indiscriminately
of whatever quantity.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (MerriamWebster, Inc. 2002).
57
See Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 3, § 4.16 and the cases cited therein.
58
See 72 Del. Laws ch. 129 (1999) (amending the definition to make clear that single-member LLC agreements are enforceable); 73 Del. Laws ch. 295 (2001) (discussed
below); 74 Del. Laws ch. 275 (2004) (discussed below); 75 Del. Laws ch. 51 (2005)
(amending the definition to clarify that members, managers, and assignees need not
execute the LLC agreement in order to be bound by its terms); 76 Del. Laws ch. 105
(2006) (expanding the definition to include “implied” agreements in addition to written
and oral agreements).
59
73 Del. Laws ch. 295 (2001). While casting doubt on the efficacy of the twoagreement approach, the amendment does make clear that the Form 5A LLC Operating Agreement (which took the title “Operating Agreement” from Form 5A instead of
“Limited Liability Company Agreement,” as would be consistent with the DLLCA) is an
LLC agreement under the DLLCA.
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read together as one agreement governing the business and affairs of the LLC.
[c] The Solution to the Liability Problem: Putting
the Pieces Back Together
A better method to insulate the members from the liability concerns underlying the two-agreement approach is to expressly allocate liability in the LLC agreement and expressly limit the ability
of third parties to enforce those provisions of the LLC agreement,
a method made possible by the flexibility of the DLLCA as
amended. To further such an approach, the Modest Form includes
the following language:
NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING IN THIS AGREEMENT TO
THE CONTRARY, NO PERSON OR ENTITY OTHER THAN A
MEMBER SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO ENFORCE ANY REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF A MEMBER HEREUNDER,
OR ANY OBLIGATION OF A MEMBER TO CONTRIBUTE CAPITAL HEREUNDER, TO FUND CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS, TO
REIMBURSE OR INDEMNIFY ANY OTHER MEMBER HEREUNDER, AND SPECIFICALLY NEITHER THE COMPANY NOR
ANY LENDER OR OTHER THIRD PARTY SHALL HAVE ANY
SUCH RIGHTS, IT BEING EXPRESSLY UNDERSTOOD THAT
THE REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, AND THE CONTRIBUTION, REIMBURSEMENT AND INDEMNIFICATION OBLIGATIONS SET FORTH IN [SPECIFIC SECTIONS] SHALL BE
ENFORCEABLE ONLY BY A MEMBER AGAINST ANOTHER
MEMBER (WHICH, NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING TO THE
CONTRARY IN THIS AGREEMENT, ARE IN ALL SUCH CASES
FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE MEMBERS). FOR THE AVOIDANCE
OF DOUBT, THE COMPANY SHALL BE BOUND BY [SPECIFIC
SECTIONS], BUT SHALL HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENFORCE
THOSE PROVISIONS AGAINST A MEMBER, SUCH RIGHTS BE59.1
ING EXCLUSIVELY VESTED IN THE MEMBERS.

The approach of including specific language in the LLC Agreement to remove the ability of a creditor to reasonably rely on a
contribution obligation in extending credit is a common practice,
and is supported by the 2004 amendment to the definition of “limited liability company agreement” in the DLLCA, which provides
that an LLC may provide rights to third parties, but only “to the
60
extent set forth” in the LLC Agreement.
59.1
Modest Form § 4.9(d).
60
74 Del. Laws ch. 275 (2004).
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Whether such an approach might also be respected with respect
to removing the ability of the LLC itself to enforce those contribution obligations (and other obligations of the members) has not
been settled; but the authors believe, for several reasons, that appropriate language would be enforced by the Delaware courts. For
example, the DLLCA provides that “[e]xcept as provided in a limited liability company agreement, a member is obligated to a limited liability company to perform any promise to contribute cash
or property or to perform services.”61 Further, it is a stated policy
of the DLLCA to “give the maximum effect to the principle of
freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability
company agreements.”62
[3] Environmental Liabilities, Representations, and
Warranties
Form 5A LLC includes detailed environmental provisions and a
new scheme for allocating environmental liabilities between the
members that were first introduced in Form 5A. The Commentary to Form 5A describes the addition of those environmental
provisions as follows:
Given the significance that environmental concerns have acquired
during the last decade, Form 5A contains provisions placing environmental compliance within the purpose of the Agreement (Section 2.3(f)); incorporates warranties and representations regarding
environmental conditions (Section 3.2(g)); allocates and limits responsibility for pre-existing environmental problems (Section 3.7(a));
and provides for establishing and funding an environmental compli62.1
ance fund (Exhibit B, Paragraph 2.14).

Form 5 contains little detail about the allocation of risk for environmental liabilities. Consistent with the philosophy of basing the
Modest Form primarily on Form 5, the approach taken in the
Modest Form is to include the Form 5A provisions relating to environmental compliance and funding of environmental obligations
(generally regarded as accepted and non-controversial), but excluding the Form 5A environmental representations and warranties, liability allocation and related indemnities (which the au61
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-502(a) (elec. 2007) (emphasis added).
62
Id. § 18-1101(b).
62.1
Form 5A Commentary § II(A)(1), at ii.
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thors viewed as more commonly subject to the negotiation of the
parties and the circumstances of the particular transaction).
The most significant additions to the representations and warranties from Form 5 to Form 5A involve environmental liabilities,
including the addition of detailed representations and warranties
relating to preexisting environmental conditions in section 3.2(g)
of the Form 5A LLC Members’ Agreement. Because representations and warranties generally are highly negotiated and tailored
based on the due diligence of the parties, consistent with the “hybrid philosophy” of forms employed in the Modest Form, such
provisions should be considered more as example provisions rather than model provisions. Similarly, the cap on XCO’s environmental indemnity in section 3.6(a) of the Form 5A LLC Members’
Agreement and the limited right of YCO under section 3.2(b) of
the Form 5A LLC Operating Agreement to resign and limit its
environmental exposure are provisions that would usually be subject to substantial negotiation. The authors recognize that
Form 5’s treatment of these important issues, frankly, is inadequate for modern mining practice. While the comprehensive
treatment of the subject in Form 5A LLC is admirable, the highly
negotiable nature of these provisions led to a retreat to the original “Modest Form paradigm” of simplicity and the suggestion that
these provisions form the core of a set of alternate environmental
provisions.
From the perspective of developing a form LLC agreement, the
allocation of risk for pre-existing environmental problems may be
better suited to a separate agreement: not a “Members’ Agreement,” but an agreement akin to a purchase agreement, perhaps
titled a “Contribution Agreement.” In fact, the committee drafting
the next generation of Form 5 should consider relocating all representations and warranties, including existing representations
regarding title and those that could be added regarding the status
of the parties under applicable securities laws, to a separate contribution agreement. Although it may seem hypocritical to advocate in one portion of the chapter to unify two agreements into
one, then advocate in another portion of the chapter to strip out
certain provisions, arguably representations and warranties do
not relate to the ongoing “affairs of a limited liability company
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and the conduct of its business.”63 Rather, representations and
warranties are made as of a point in time, usually prior to or contemporaneous with the execution of the LLC agreement, but certainly prior to the commencement of the joint venture operations.
[4] Security Interests
Section 4.3(b) of the Form 5A LLC Members’ Agreement includes a grant by each member of a security interest in its entire
membership interest to secure “every obligation or liability of the
Member granting such lien or security interest” under both the
Members’ Agreement and the Operating Agreement. The security
interest granted in Form 5 secures only the obligation of a defaulting member to repay a non-defaulting member that has
made a loan to the defaulting member to cover its capital contributions.64 The Modest Form includes the broader security interest contemplated by Form 5A LLC because of the significant capital contribution obligations, continuing obligations, and indemnification obligations, in addition to the manager’s obligations with
respect to operations.64.1 The security interest provisions in the
Modest Form, however, have been modified to reflect changes in
the law under revised article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.65 Under revised Article 9, a secured party is permitted to
file a financing statement covering the applicable collateral if the
debtor authorizes the filing in an authenticated record (i.e., an executed document) or becomes bound to a security agreement with
respect to such collateral.66 The Modest Form also includes a provision specifically providing for the admission of the transferee as
a member in the LLC (not just an assignee of the economic inter-

63
DLLCA, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (elec. 2007).
64
Form 5 § 6.4(a).
64.1
Modest Form § 6.7.
65
U.C.C. §§ 9-101 to 9-709. The stated purpose in the Form 5A Commentary for including the attorney-in-fact language was to allow a secured member to foreclose and
take the entire interest, not just an economic interest.
66
Id. § 9-509(a), (b). Although the LLC agreement constitutes a security agreement
under the Uniform Commercial Code, see generally U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(73), it is customary to expressly include the relevant authorization.
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est) upon the foreclosure or similar exercise of remedies by the
non-defaulting member.67
[5] Transfers
[a] Non-Recognition of Transfers
Consistent with Form 5, Form 5A LLC provides that the transferee of an interest in the LLC must provide notice and agree to
be bound by the LLC agreement to have the rights of a member.68
Under the DLLCA, a person may be an assignee of an economic
interest without being admitted to the LLC as a member.69 Although the assignee of an economic interest continues to have
rights to distributions and allocations of profit and loss, the economic interest is free of voting and other member rights.70 Consistent with more common recent practice, the Modest Form provides that the LLC need not recognize the transfer itself if the as71
signee has not agreed to be bound by the LLC agreement.
[b] Beneficial Interests
Form 5A LLC prohibits transfers of “any beneficial interest” in
the Company except in connection with the transfer of some or all
of a member’s ownership interest.72 The presumed intent behind
this provision is to limit transfers of rights that somehow constitute less than the entire bundle of rights that make up a membership interest (similar to the Form 5A restriction on transfer of any
interest in the property separate from the obligations of the joint
venture agreement). The term “beneficial interest” is defined dif67
Modest Form § 6.7. Form 5A LLC provides for the appointment of the other member as its attorney-in-fact for the purpose of consenting to the transfer of the management rights—not just the economic interest—associated with the membership interest.
See Form 5A Commentary § 6.6. Note that the consent rights of the defaulting member
are likely eliminated upon the foreclosure because the defaulting member ceases to be
a member in the LLC. See DLLCA, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-702(b)(3) (elec. 2007).
However, in a two-member LLC, the non-defaulting member would thereafter own
100% of the voting interests (i.e., excluding the interests that were foreclosed), and
could simply admit itself as a member with respect to the interest that was foreclosed.
68
Form 5A LLC Operating Agreement § 7.2(b).
69
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-702(b) (elec. 2007).
70
Id.
71
Modest Form § 15.2(a). DLLCA, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-702(a) (elec. 2007)
permits restrictions on transfer in the LLC agreement.
72
Form 5A LLC Operating Agreement §§ 7.1, 7.2(a).
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ferently in different circumstances, and could be interpreted to
preclude certain indirect transfers that the parties may wish to
permit.73 To clarify, the Modest Form defines “Transfer” to include indirect transfers that result in a change of control, but not
other indirect transfers.73.1
[c] Actions as a Group
Under Form 5A LLC, if a member transfers an interest, the
transferring member and the transferee member must thereafter
act as a group by collectively designating an agent to act for the
group and providing notice of the designation.74 In order to avoid
a conflict, the Modest Form does not require the designation of an
agent; instead, it simply provides that the member with the largest percentage interest has control of the voting rights of the
group.74.1
[d] Pledges
Form 5A LLC contains detailed provisions that require the recipient of a pledge of a member’s interest in the LLC to enter into
an agreement with the non-pledging member stating that the recipient has no right to foreclose and limiting its remedy to selling
the interest to the non-pledging member.75 Section 9-408 of the
Uniform Commercial Code provides that restrictions on the
pledge of personal property are unenforceable.76 Since Form 5A
LLC was released, however, the DLLCA was amended to add section 18-1101(g), which specifically provides that section 9-408
shall have no application to interests in LLCs.77 As an alternative
73
For example, “beneficial ownership” can have a number of meanings when used in
the context of a security. See SEC Rule 13d-3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a) (elec. 2007)
(“For the purposes of sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Act a beneficial owner of a security
includes any person who, directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement,
understanding, relationship, or otherwise has or shares: (1) Voting power which includes the power to vote, or to direct the voting of, such security; and/or, (2) Investment
power which includes the power to dispose, or to direct the disposition of, such security.”).
73.1
Modest Form § 1.32.
74
Form 5A LLC Operating Agreement § 7.2(f).
74.1
Modest Form § 15.2(e).
75
Form 5A LLC Operating Agreement § 7.2(g).
76
U.C.C. § 9-408.
77
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-1101(g) (elec. 2007).
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to limiting the effects of a pledge and working through the relevant language, the parties could simply agree that pledges are
impermissible without the consent of the other party (which may
be the most appropriate default rule for a form). The Modest
Form attempts to strike a balance, permitting the pledge but
providing that upon a foreclosure the lender obtains only the
rights of an assignee, i.e., no rights to vote or manage the LLC.77.1
The Modest Form also makes clear that a transfer to such a lender upon default or foreclosure is subject to the preemptive right
78
contained in the various forms.
[e] Preemptive Right
The “preemptive right” present in the various forms79 has been
renamed in the Modest Form as an “acquisition right,” consistent
with more common recent usage. A preemptive right would typically apply to interests to be issued by the LLC itself.
[6] Other Matters
[a] Distributions In Kind
Taking production in kind is an important concept in Form 5,80
but the drafters of Form 5A LLC removed the provision for taking
in kind because the tax reasons for it do not exist in the LLC context.81 The authors believe that some parties may want to require
distribution of mineral products in kind for business reasons and
thus have retained this provision. DLLCA § 18-605 states that,
except as provided in an LLC agreement, a member has no right
77.1
Modest Form § 15.2(f).
78
Id. See Form 5 § 15.3.
79
Form 5 § 15.3.
80
Id. art. XI. Under section 761(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, participants in a
mining joint venture are generally taxed as a partnership, but have the right to elect
not to be taxed as a partnership if the terms of the joint venture meet certain requirements, including granting the parties the right to take their shares of production in
kind. The taking-in-kind provision may have been included in Form 5 to enable the
parties to elect not to be taxed as a partnership. See Form 5A Commentary § 4.2. The
absence of joint marketing of products in Form 5 may also be intended to defeat a claim
that the joint venture is a partnership or mining partnership. Avoidance of partnership
or mining partnership liability should not be a concern in the LLC context.
81
Edquist & Hubbard, supra note 10, § 13.03[2][g][iii]. An LLC is taxed as a partnership in all events (unless it elects to be taxed as a corporation), and therefore does
not have the flexibility to elect not to be taxed as a partnership. As a result, the takingin-kind provision is unnecessary for tax reasons.
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to demand a distribution in kind, but may be compelled to take in
kind. Consistent with Form 5, the Modest Form makes clear that
a member may be compelled to take in kind, but also makes clear,
consistent with the DLLCA, that a member may not demand an
in kind distribution.81.1 The parties are free to negotiate the provision, including whether taking in kind will be mandatory unless
unanimously agreed otherwise, or at the discretion of the manager.
[b] Supplemental Business Arrangements
Form 5A LLC contains a provision permitting the members of
the management committee to segregate the area of interest covered by the agreement into one or more separate business arrangements through unanimous agreement.82 Such a provision is
unnecessary at the outset because, if the parties can unanimously
agree to a supplemental business arrangement, they could always
agree to an amendment to the LLC agreement, an amendment
that would likely be required in any case if the parties agree on
such a supplemental business arrangement. In joint ventures
covering a large area of interest, such as uranium exploration
ventures, the parties may want to provide for the division of the
area of interest into “project areas” under separate agreements to
avoid dilution in the entire area when the parties have different
exploration priorities, and the parties may desire non-consent exploration or development rights, back-in rights, and other provisions best left to custom drafting.83 Such provisions may be suitable for development as alternative provisions to the Modest Form.
[c] Timing of Initial Contributions; Title
Considerations
Consideration should be given to the timing of the Initial Contributions by the Members, both of the properties and cash contributions. Form 5 and Form 5A reflect an “earn in” paradigm
whereby an interest in the properties may be “earned” by or vested in YCO only after expenditure of its agreed Initial Contribution on Operations for the benefit of the Properties, although the
81.1
Modest Form § 11.2.
82
Form 5A LLC Operating Agreement § 10.13.
83
See, e.g., Harold S. Bloomenthal, “The Evolution of the Uranium Joint Venture,”
Uranium Exploration and Development 8-1 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 1976).
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details of holding title prior to and after completion of YCO’s Initial Contribution and the amount and timing of expenditures for
Operations are left to individual negotiation. The Modest Form
provides that title to the Properties will be held by the LLC, and
YCO’s entire cash Initial Contribution could theoretically be made
to the LLC immediately upon signing the LLC agreement and
subsequently expended by the LLC for operations. Parties desiring the “earn in” approach of Forms 5 and 5A should consider
specifying the timing of the Initial Contributions of the parties in
section 6.1 of the Modest Form and its affect on voting and other
rights arising from the parties’ membership interests in the LLC.
If YCO’s contributions are made immediately and held by the
LLC pending expenditure on approved Programs and Budgets,
the parties should consider the impact of this arrangement on any
desired right of YCO to withdraw from the LLC without liability
for the balance of its Initial Contribution, particularly in light of
section 5.4 of the Modest Form limiting the return of capital contributions.
As stated in section 2.4 of the Modest Form, title to the Properties will be held by the LLC and will need to be conveyed to the
LLC by appropriate deeds and assignments. When using Form 5
and Form 5A, parties contributing property have sometimes been
reluctant to part with title to their property prior to YCO’s completion of all expenditures required to earn its interest, sometimes
retaining title until completion of YCO’s Initial Contribution or
using a lease, exploration agreement, escrow, or other arrangement.84 Despite those rational concerns, immediate conveyance to
the LLC may offer superior bankruptcy protection for both parties, and should be considered.85
The DLLCA affords significant protections to the non-bankrupt
members in the event of the bankruptcy of a member. For example, under DLLCA § 18-304, a person ceases to be a member of an
84
See, e.g., Edquist & Hubbard, supra note 10, § 13.03[2][c]. Some of the issues
raised by joint holding of title in Form 5 and Form 5A are discussed in Form 5A, Commentary § 3.4.
85
See Uranium JV Paper, supra note 4, at 10-7 (“Holding the property in the limited
liability company may offer protection against the bankruptcy of one of the members
. . . , and YCO will probably prefer immediate conveyance to the LLC to obtain this protection.”).
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LLC upon its bankruptcy or an assignment for the benefit of its
creditors. Similarly, under DLLCA § 18-702, an assignee of an
LLC interest has economic rights to distributions and allocations
of profits and losses, but no right to participate in the management of the business and affairs of the LLC.
The provisions of the DLLCA, however, potentially conflict with
the rights of the bankruptcy estate under the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code. Under the Bankruptcy Code, upon the bankruptcy of a
member, at a minimum the economic rights of the member to distributions and to allocations of profits and losses pass to the
bankruptcy estate, despite contractual provisions or state law
purporting to modify or terminate the bankrupt member’s interest in property upon the occurrence of the bankruptcy (sometimes
referred to as “ipso facto” provisions).86 Under another provision
of the Bankruptcy Code, however, if the LLC agreement is an
“executory contract,” the foregoing DLLCA provisions may effectively prevent the bankrupt member or bankruptcy trustee from
exercising the bankrupt member’s voting and other rights associ87
ated with its interest in the LLC. The law is unsettled as to
86
See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (elec. 2007):
[A]n interest of the debtor in property becomes property of the [bankruptcy] estate . . . notwithstanding any provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or applicable nonbankruptcy law—(A) that restricts or conditions
transfer of such interest by the debtor; or (B) that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor, on the commencement of a [bankruptcy] case . . . or on the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in
a [bankruptcy] case . . . and that effects or gives an option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or termination of the debtor's interest in property.
87
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (elec. 2007):
(1) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract . . ., or in applicable law, an executory contract . . . may not be terminated or modified, and
any right or obligation under such contract or lease may not be terminated or
modified, at any time after the commencement of the case solely because of a
provision in such contract or lease that is conditioned on [bankruptcy, insolvency, or the appointment of a receiver] . . . (2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to an executory contract . . . of the debtor, whether or not
such contract . . . prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of
duties, if . . . applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such
contract . . . from accepting performance from or rendering performance to
the trustee or to an assignee of such contract . . ., whether or not such contract . . . prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties;
and . . . such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment; or . . .
such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or
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which Bankruptcy Code provision is controlling in analyzing an
LLC agreement and whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts the
DLLCA to the extent the DLLCA provides for the extinguishment
of the member’s non-economic management rights.88 Despite any
uncertainty arising from the foregoing considerations, the LLC
almost certainly offers superior bankruptcy protection to a joint
venture where title to property is held jointly by the venture
partners.
[d] Additional Audit Rights
In addition to the right of either member to request an audit of
independent public accountants, under section 11.6(b) of the
Form 5A LLC Operating Agreement, either member may request
additional audits with the costs paid by the requesting member.
This additional audit to address any “issues raised by the requesting member” must also be an “independent” audit. An additional
right of the minority member to raise “issues” and select its own
“independent” auditor should be re-examined given the increased
regulatory and other scrutiny imposed on public accountants
since Enron. Such a provision is a tempting right that, if exercised, could unintentionally undermine the critical trust necessary in a joint venture relationship.

financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or to issue a security of the debtor.
88
Compare In re Ehmann, 319 B.R. 200 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) (holding that the
non-managing member’s entire interest as a member passed to the bankruptcy estate
(but basing its holding in part on the fact that the non-managing member had no management rights so the LLC agreement could not be considered an executory contract as
to the member)) with Milford Power Co., LLC v. PDC Milford Power, LLC, 866 A.2d
738 (Del. Ch. 2004) (concluding that the LLC agreement was preempted to the extent it
stripped the debtor of its economic rights, but was enforceable to the extent of sections 18-304 and -702 of the DLLCA, which state that the debtor ceases to be a member
upon bankruptcy, but that the bankruptcy estate retains its status as an economic interest holder as an assignee); In re Albright, 291 B.R. 538 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003) (substituting a trustee as a member in a single-member LLC but noting that with respect
to a multi-member LLC, a non-debtor member could probably block admission except
in the case of hindering, delaying, or defrauding creditors). As the court in Milford
Power remarked, “[a] law professor could fruitfully spend the next year or so examining
the implications that the Bankruptcy Code has on ipso facto clauses in alternative entity agreements.” Milford Power, 866 A.2d at 756.
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§ 13.05 What’s “New” in the Modest Form?
[1] Fiduciary Duties and Operator Exculpation
[a] DLLCA Amendments and Developing Judicial
Doctrines
Much has been established about fiduciary duties in LLCs since
the publication of Form 5A LLC. As of the drafting of Form 5A
LLC, the DLLCA simply provided with respect to fiduciary duties
of members and managers that, to the extent such duties (including fiduciary duties) existed at law or in equity (i.e., implied duties), the members and managers would not be liable for their
good faith reliance on the provisions of the LLC agreement; and
such duties and liabilities could be expanded or restricted by pro89
visions in the LLC Agreement. In 2004, those provisions were
amended to permit the elimination of those duties by the LLC
Agreement, subject to the qualification that the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing could not be eliminat90
ed. Other provisions were added by the 2004 amendment to
permit the LLC agreement to limit or eliminate liability for
breach of duties (including fiduciary duties) and for breach of contract, again other than the implied contractual covenant of good
91
faith and fair dealing.
The amendments to the DLLCA, however, left to the courts
whether members and managers of an LLC were subject to implied fiduciary duties.92 The Delaware courts have not only settled that such implied duties exist,93 but that corporate doctrines
such as the entire fairness standard in the merger context,94 and

89
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (1997) (amended 2004).
90
74 Del. Laws ch. 275 (2004). See also Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (elec.
2007).
91
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-1101(d) & (e) (elec. 2007).
92
See Edquist & Hubbard, supra note 10, § 13.06[4] (“Whether or not fiduciary duties are explicitly included in the applicable state statute is probably not the end of the
story.”).
93
See VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, No. 17995, 2000 WL 1277372 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2000),
aff’d, 781 A.2d 696 (Del. 2001).
94
See Solar Cells, Inc. v. True N. Partners, LLC, No. 19477, 2002 WL 749163 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 25, 2002).
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the application of the Revlon doctrine in a change of control
transaction,95 are also applicable to LLCs.
Because it bears repeating, the amendments to the statute
make clear that all such duties, other than the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and any liability for
breach of such duties or breach of contract, may be eliminated in
96
the LLC agreement. The contractual covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, the duty referred to in the DLLCA that may not be
eliminated, likely is not a fiduciary duty at all. The existence and
scope of an implied fiduciary duty of good faith in Delaware has
been the subject of much discussion recently among corporate
practitioners,97 but such esoteric considerations may be academic
for the LLC practitioner since any implied fiduciary duties can be
disclaimed under the DLLCA. Whether or not an implied fiduciary duty of good faith actually exists in Delaware, because an
LLC, like a partnership, is a creature of contract, the parties to
such agreement will remain subject to the contractual covenant of
good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract.98
[b] “Holy Grail” or Too Much of a Good Thing?
Since the dawn of the mining venture, mining practitioners
(and Forms 5, 5A, and 5A LLC) have attempted to define the duties between the parties in the contract and to limit or eliminate
implied duties, including fiduciary duties, between joint venturers. All the while, serious doubts have persisted whether these
provisions were enforceable or whether applicable law, including
99
the law of partnership, would impose a fiduciary standard. Sim95
See Blackmore Partners, L.P. v. Link Energy LLC, No. 454-N, 2004 WL 2580497
(Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2004).
96
DLLCA, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c), (e) (elec. 2007).
97
See Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 67
n.112 (Del. 2006) (“[W]e do not reach or otherwise address the issue of whether the fiduciary duty to act in good faith is a duty that, like the duties of care and loyalty, can
serve as an independent basis for imposing liability upon corporate officers and directors.”).
98
Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1054 (Del. Ch. 1984); see also RJ Assocs. v.
Health Payors’ Org. Ltd. Pshp., No. 16873, 1999 WL 550350, at *30 (Del. Ch. July 16,
1999) (applying the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the partnership
setting).
99
See, e.g., Welborn & Karpov, supra note 24; Ernest E. Smith, “Duties and Obligations Owed by an Operator to Nonoperators, Investors, and Other Interest Owners,” 32

13–30

MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE

ilarly, parties have often sought to define by contract the operator’s liability for assuming the risk-laden conduct of mineral exploration and development and to limit the operator’s liability to
its venture partners to violation of a gross negligence/willful misconduct standard. The amended DLLCA provisions discussed
above may be the “Holy Grail” for eliminating implied duties inconsistent with these goals.
The Modest Form assumes that the parties are sophisticated
and therefore desire, to the extent possible, to negotiate and set
forth in the LLC agreement the standard of care and specific duties that apply to the parties (as opposed to implied duties being
imposed on the parties by the courts). The following language has
been inserted into the indicated sections of the Modest Form to
take advantage of the ability of the parties to contract around the
default rules in the DLLCA, and to negate any implied fiduciary
duties of the manager and the members (other than the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing):
To the fullest extent permitted by the Act, this Agreement shall control as to any conflict between this Agreement and the Act or as to
any matter provided for in this Agreement that is also provided for
100
in the Act.
There are no implied covenants contained in this Agreement other
than those of the contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
No Manager shall have any fiduciary or other duties to the Company
except as specifically provided by this Agreement, and the Manager’s and Members’ duties and liabilities otherwise existing at law or
in equity are restricted and eliminated by the provisions of this
Agreement to those duties and liabilities specifically set forth in this
101
Agreement.

Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 12-2 (1986); Christopher Lane & Catherine J. Boggs, “Duties of
Operator or Manager to Its Joint Venturers,” 29 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 199 (1983);
Howard L. Boigon & Christine L. Murphy, “Liabilities of Nonoperating Interest Owners,” Mining Agreements 1-1 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 1979). These provisions continue
to spawn litigation to this day. See, e.g., NovaGold Resources Inc. v. Barrick Gold
Corp., No. 3:06-cv-00199TMB 7-11 (D. Alaska July 17, 2007) (dismissing claim of
breach of fiduciary duty under joint venture agreement containing disclaimer of fiduciary duties and “gross negligence/willful misconduct” standard identical to Form 5).
100
Modest Form § 3.1.
101
Id. § 4.8. The standard of conduct of the members and manager “specifically set
forth” in the Modest Form, in addition to the contractual covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, is the gross negligence/willful misconduct standard. Id. §§ 4.9(c)(iii), 8.3.
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Form 5 and each of its successors contain virtually identical
standards of care and exculpation of liability standards applicable
to the operator or manager.102 With respect to Form 5 and
Form 5A, because a joint venture is no more than a creature of
contract, those stated standards were intended to be the only
standards to which the manager was subject. Form 5A LLC, however, is an LLC and the members and manager are subject to the
implied fiduciary and other duties that have been recognized by
the courts. As such, those implied duties and liabilities must be
eliminated or restricted for the “bargain” to be the same as intended in the original joint venture context.
The “Holy Grail” of limited duties may be too much of a good
thing for some joint venture relationships. The Modest Form provides that the duties of the members and Manager are limited to
those specified in the agreement and further provides that good
faith reliance on the agreement is a defense to a claim of breach
102.1
by the LLC or the other member.
Ambiguities in the LLC
agreement may therefore inadvertently shield the members from
liability to each other, if there exists more than one good faith interpretation of a disputed provision. Parties holding a minority
membership interest, those less experienced in mining activities,
or parties that have bargained for a joint venture with an experienced mine operator may desire a higher standard of conduct by
the other party. In such cases, the amended DLLCA permits the
duties of the parties to be tailored to the circumstances.
[2] Continuing Obligations
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of the Form 5A LLC Members’ Agreement
include provisions regarding Continuing Obligations originally
contained in sections 6.6 and 12.4 of Form 5. Form 5A LLC defines Continuing Obligations as “obligations or responsibilities
that are reasonably expected to continue or arise after Operations
on a particular area of the Properties have ceased or are suspended, such as future monitoring, stabilization, or Environmental
103
Compliance.”
The Continuing Obligations provisions in Form 5
and Form 5A LLC generally provide that a member continues to
102
See Form 5 § 8.3; Form 5A LLC Operating Agreement § 9.3.
102.1
Modest Form § 4.8.
103
Form 5A LLC Operating Agreement, Exhibit D.
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be liable for its share of liabilities of the LLC after its resignation
or deemed resignation from the LLC, the termination of the LLC,
or the adjustment of its interest.
The Form 5A LLC Members’ Agreement contains a detailed
indemnification provision stating that each member shall indemnify the other member for breaches of representations or covenants contained in the Members’ Agreement or the LLC Agreement.104
The concept that one member should be personally liable to the
other and should indemnify the other for its proportionate share
of liabilities relating to the venture makes perfect sense in the
case of a common law joint venture or a general partnership
where each partner is personally liable for the obligations of the
venture; however, such a concept must be considered carefully
when the starting point is that the members are not personally
liable for the obligations of the LLC so as not to negate that basic
proposition.105 The Modest Form combines and refines the two
separate sections relating to Continuing Obligations into one section 6.6, and makes clear that such obligations are limited to reimbursement and are not intended to make a member personally
liable for the obligations of the LLC.
[3] Indemnification
If a member or manager were found to be personally liable for
obligations relating to the LLC, it normally would request indemnification by the LLC to the extent of the LLC’s assets. If the
LLC’s assets were insufficient to cover those losses, it may be appropriate for one member to look to the other member for its proportionate share of the loss, to the extent that the loss was not the
fault of the member seeking indemnification. The indemnification
by the LLC of the members in the Form 5A LLC Operating
Agreement provides that the Company may, and has the power
to, indemnify the members and managers, but does not require
104
Form 5A LLC Members’ Agreement § 3.6.
105
See DLLCA, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-303(b) (elec. 2007) (“Notwithstanding the
provisions of subsection (a) of this section, under a limited liability company agreement
or under another agreement, a member or manager may agree to be obligated personally for any or all of the debts, obligations and liabilities of the limited liability company.”).
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such indemnification.106 The footnote to that section cites DLLCA
§ 18-108, stating that such indemnification is not required, but is
permissive.107 Form 5A LLC, however, never resolves the question of who decides when indemnification is appropriate, leaving
that to the negotiation of the parties after the loss has already occurred. At that point, under the Form 5A LLC liability regime,
the member subject to the loss could look to the other member
under the Continuing Obligations and member indemnification
provisions. To the extent, however, that the other member is insolvent, the member could have to absorb more than its proportionate share of the loss, even if the LLC has sufficient assets to
cover the entire loss. The authors believe that all managers and
members are entitled to indemnification from the LLC to the extent that such members or managers have not violated the relevant standard of care. The authors further believe that most parties would require an indemnification provision at the time the
contract is drafted to avoid a dispute over indemnification after
the occurrence of the loss.
The Modest Form includes a new section 4.9 that attempts to
reconcile the various inconsistencies regarding the allocation of
risk scheme in Form 5, Form 5A, and Form 5A LLC with the authors’ perceptions about the intended allocation of risk. It begins
with a general statement that members and managers are not liable for the obligations of the LLC to set the stage for the indemnifications.108 New section 4.9 then continues with an indemnification of the members and managers by the LLC for third-party
claims. In order not to negate the contractual duty provisions, indemnification by the LLC of a member or manager is restricted to
the extent that the loss arises from the willful misconduct or gross
negligence of the party seeking indemnification, i.e., the standard
of care contained in each of Form 5, Form 5A, and Form 5A

106
See Form 5A LLC Operating Agreement § 5.12.
107
Id. at n.5.
108
Form 5A LLC Members’ Agreement § 3.5 also contains a limitation of liability
provision. Although not uncommon, the provision is really no more than a recitation of
DLLCA § 18-303.
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LLC.109 The indemnification by the LLC also covers the reimbursement obligation of the members for Continuing Liabilities
discussed above, and clarifies that indemnification by the LLC is
limited to the assets of the LLC and members are not personally
liable for the indemnity.
New section 4.9 then provides for an indemnification by each
member of the other member(s) and the LLC for actions taken
without authority, breaches of representations and warranties,
and breaches of covenants. Consistent with the indemnification
from the LLC, the indemnification by one member of the other
member for breaches of covenants (but not for breaches of representations and actions without authority) is only required to the
extent that the breach constitutes willful misconduct or gross negligence. Note also that if the intent of such indemnity is to protect
one member from the actions of the other member, the entire economic interest in the LLC of the member to be protected remains
at risk unless the LLC also is a beneficiary of the indemnity. As
such, the Modest Form includes the LLC as a party to the member indemnity. The practitioner, however, should consider carefully such an inclusion. The parties might be willing to sacrifice their
investment so long as they are protected in those instances of personal liability to the members for obligations of or relating to the
LLC.
[4] Dissolution, Resignation, and Liquidation
[a] Dissolution
The dissolution provision in section 12.1 of the Modest Form
substantially follows section 12.1 of Form 5, incorporating section 12.2 of Form 5 to provide for dissolution of the LLC (instead
of termination of the agreement, as provided in Form 5) if the
Management Committee fails to adopt a program and budget.
Form 5A LLC also requires the dissolution of the Company upon
the resignation of a member or upon the bankruptcy, insolvency,
dissolution, or assignment for the benefit of creditors of a member, “or as otherwise provided by the Act.”109.1 The DLLCA does
109
Indemnification for actions without authority is contained in § 4.1 of Form 5 and
in § 5.1 of Form 5A LLC. It was relocated to § 4.9 of the Modest Form to put all of the
indemnifications in one location in the agreement.
109.1
5A LLC Operating Agreement § 14.1.
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not require the dissolution of an LLC upon the resignation of a
member or upon an involuntary transfer of a member’s LLC interest. In fact, DLLCA § 18-801(b) states the opposite, i.e., that
[u]nless otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement, the death, retirement, resignation, expulsion, bankruptcy or
dissolution of any member or the occurrence of any other event that
terminates the continued membership of any member shall not
cause the limited liability company to be dissolved or its affairs to be
wound up, and upon the occurrence of any such event, the limited li109.2
ability company shall be continued without dissolution.

It is unlikely that a remaining member would desire for the
LLC to dissolve upon the resignation or bankruptcy of the other
member, as the remaining member has the discretion under the
DLLCA to decide whether to continue. Upon the bankruptcy of a
member, the bankruptcy estate probably only acquires rights in
the LLC as an assignee. 110 Instead of dissolution, the DLLCA
provides that a person ceases to be a member upon the occurrence
of a bankruptcy event with respect to such person.111 Although
the assignee of an LLC interest is entitled to the economic rights
to which the assignor was entitled, the assignee may not exercise
any rights or powers of a member (such as the right to vote on the
designation of the manager or on Management Committee mat112
ters, or to designate a Management Committee member).
The
remaining member therefore will be entitled to 100% of the voting
rights after the resignation, bankruptcy, or dissolution of the other member, and should have the sole vote as to whether to dissolve the Company.
As a final note on dissolution, section 18-802 of the DLLCA provides that the Court of Chancery may upon application of a member or manager decree the judicial dissolution of an LLC. If the
parties desire to prohibit a member from making such an application, the LLC agreement should make the prohibition explicit and

109.2
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-801(b) (elec. 2007).
110
See supra § 13.04[6][c].
111
DLLCA, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-304 (elec. 2007).
112
See id. § 18-702(b).
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could even provide for liquidated damages for making such an
application with the Court of Chancery.113
[b] Resignation and Deemed Resignation
In addition to requiring dissolution upon the resignation of a
member, Form 5A LLC’s resignation provision characterizes the
member’s resignation as a transfer of that member’s interest to
the non-resigning member.113.1 As noted above, the Modest Form
does not require dissolution upon the resignation of a member, as
the other member may desire for the LLC to continue. Also, to attempt to avoid claims against the non-resigning member for actions of the resigning member, the Modest Form characterizes the
resignation as a cancellation of the interest, instead of as a transfer.114
Deemed resignation occurs in two other places in the Modest
Form, consistent with Form 5. Section 6.4(b)(ii) of the Modest
Form contains the remedy for failure to make an agreed contribution to the Company, and permits the non-defaulting member to
treat the failure as the deemed resignation of the defaulting
member and cancellation of the defaulting member’s membership
interest. Section 6.5 of the Modest Form provides that reduction
of a member’s percentage interest to 10% constitutes a deemed
resignation and cancellation of the minority interest. Sections 18306(2) and 18-502(c) of the DLLCA permit an LLC agreement to
provide that the interest of any member that fails to make any
contribution that the member is obligated to make will be subject
to the consequences specified in the LLC agreement, including the
reduction, elimination, or “forfeiture” of the member’s entire
membership interest in the LLC. The revisions in these sections
of the Modest Form are intended to take advantage of this flexible
remedy afforded by the DLLCA, which may help address concerns

113
But see Sivsa Entertainment v. World Int’l Network, No. B164377, 2004 WL
1895080 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2004) (holding that the California LLC statute does not
permit members to modify or waive the right to judicial dissolution).
113.1
5A LLC Operating Agreement § 14.2.
114
Modest Form § 12.2. See DLLCA, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-702(e) (elec. 2007)
(providing that an LLC may acquire an LLC interest by redemption or otherwise and
once acquired the interest shall be deemed cancelled).
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that the analogous provisions of Form 5 may have been an unenforceable forfeiture or penalty.115
[c] Liquidation
The provisions of Form 5 regarding liquidation of the assets of
the venture (after dissolution in the case of an LLC) have been
significantly revised in the Modest Form. Consistent with
Form 5A LLC, the manager controls the liquidation, but the Modest Form provides for the appointment by the manager of a liquidator (which may be the manager),115.1 to allow for the flexibility
that may be desired by the manager, especially if the LLC is in
the zone of insolvency and the manager is concerned about fiduciary duties to creditors of the LLC.116
The liquidator in the Modest Form has been given broad authority, including the authority to determine whether to distribute cash or to distribute assets in kind upon liquidation. Because
dissolution may be precipitated by a variety of factors involving
antagonized venture partners, often the members have difficulty
reaching agreement during the dissolution and winding up of the
company. Granting a liquidator broad authority to make decisions
during winding up may relieve conflict and therefore maximize
distributions. Usually the interests of the members are aligned to
maximize their distributions. The exception arises when the
manager or liquidator desires to maximize reserves because of
concerns regarding contingent liabilities and the lack of sufficient
assets of the LLC to indemnify the manager for those liabilities.
Those concerns are alleviated to some extent in the context of the

115
See, e.g., Lacy, supra note 2, at § 7.05[3]. Moreover, as discussed by Lacy, the forfeiture cases often involve threatened forfeiture of real property interests. Since forfeiture of real property rights is not implicated when the LLC owns the mining property,
these cases should have less relevance to an LLC agreement. The member owns only
its membership interest (not the LLC’s real property) and, as noted in the text, the
DLLCA expressly sanctions penalties up to and including “forfeiture” of the membership interest.
115.1
Modest Form § 12.3.
116
DLLCA, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-804(b) (elec. 2007) provides that a liquidating
trustee who has complied with the reserve and liquidation requirements in that section
of the DLLCA is not personally liable to claimants, although compliance with that section requires a significant amount of judgment subject to various reasonableness
standards.
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Modest Form because of the obligation of each member to reimburse the manager and other member for continuing liabilities.
Finally, consistent with Form 5A LLC, the Modest Form eliminates the concept in Form 5 of requiring the parties to restore a
117
capital account deficit upon liquidation.
The deficit restoration
obligation, which may have been included in Form 5A for tax reasons, generally is not consistent with the terms of the business
deal so long as the member with the deficit capital account balance has made the capital contributions such member is obligated
to make and has received the distributions and allocations of profits and losses specified by the LLC agreement. Further, an obligation to make up a capital account deficit generally is not necessary to achieve the desired tax treatment. The deficit restoration
obligation requirement similarly was eliminated from Form 5A
118
LLC.
Nonetheless, practitioners should carefully consider
whether a deficit restoration obligation is appropriate for a particular transaction in light of the specific tax and business considerations.
§ 13.06 Other Matters
[1] Authority to Bind the LLC
As indicated in the footnote to article VIII of the Form 5A LLC
Agreement, the DLLCA does not reserve any special powers or
matters to the members.119 Section 18-402 of the DLLCA, however, may grant members certain authority that was unintended in
Form 5 or its reiterations, stating: “Unless otherwise provided in
a limited liability company agreement, each member and manager has the authority to bind the limited liability company.” To
avoid the argument that a person other than the manager has the
power to bind the LLC, the Modest Form includes language making clear that members of the management committee are not

117
Form 5 § 12.5.
118
Form 5A is silent on this issue. Form 5A LLC Operating Agreement § 5.11 specifically negates any contribution obligation. See the discussion in Form 5A, Commentary
to Exhibit C.
119
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-407 (elec. 2007) (providing that managers and
members have the right to delegate rights and powers to manage and control the business and affairs of the LLC).
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managers under the DLLCA, and that no members or members of
the management committee have the power to bind the LLC.119.1
[2] Action By Less Than Unanimous Written Consent
Form 5 does not provide for actions of the Management Committee by written consent. Form 5A LLC provides for action by
unanimous written consent.120 Circumstances may arise when
the expediency of important transactions does not allow sufficient
time to hold a meeting or opportunity to obtain the written consent of all of the members. For this reason, the Modest Form includes a written consent provision permitted under DLLCA § 18302(d) that allows action by less than unanimous written consent,
but also provides that notice of any such action should be provided to the member holding the minority interest.120.1 This provision, although permitted by the DLLCA, may be substantially inconsistent with the business understanding of a mining joint venture, where significant decisions such as approval of annual
programs and budgets are often taken after one or more meetings
and opportunity for discussion, even when one party has a majority voting interest. As such, the practitioner may consider it more
suitable as an alternative provision.
§ 13.07 Dispute Resolution Considerations
As stated in the commentary to Form 5, Form 5 does not recommend any particular method for resolving disputes, but it does
include sample language regarding arbitration.121 Form 5A LLC
includes a governing law provision and no more.122 Although the
Modest Form does not take on the difficult task of crafting an arbitration provision, one should be provided as an alternate provision to a new form of LLC agreement.
Any form provisions regarding disputes should consider important provisions of the DLLCA and case law thereunder which
may implicate the resolution of disputes. For example, a party
that desires to litigate a dispute should consider whether claims
119.1
Modest Form § 7.1.
120
Form 5A LLC Operating Agreement § 8.4.
120.1
Modest Form § 7.4.
121
See Form 5 Commentary, art. XVI.
122
See Form 5A LLC Operating Agreement, art. XV.
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are required to be brought as derivative claims under sections 181001 through -1004 of the DLLCA or as direct claims.123 If the
wrong approach is taken by a litigator, the pleading party could
risk dismissal.124 A derivative action may be brought only if managers or members with authority to do so have refused to bring
the action (i.e., demand has been made), or making such a demand would be futile.125 If the LLC agreement contemplates that
disputes will be litigated instead of arbitrated, the parties may
consider attempting to waive in the LLC agreement any requirement to bring claims as derivative claims or to make a demand on
the members or managers with authority. Whether such a provision would be respected by the Delaware Court of Chancery is unclear.
If the parties desire arbitration, it is clear that the parties may
agree to arbitrate some, if not all, disputes regarding a Delaware
LLC in those cases involving broadly drafted arbitration claus126
es.
If the parties desire arbitration, to avoid lengthy and expensive court proceedings the parties also should make clear in
the LLC Agreement whether the Delaware Court of Chancery or
the arbitrators decide issues of arbitrability.127
§ 13.08 Exhibit C: Tax Matters
The appropriate starting point for the tax provisions in Exhibit
C of the Modest Form is the corresponding set of tax provisions in
Exhibit C to Form 5A LLC. The Form 5A LLC tax provisions re123
See VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, No. 17995, 2000 WL 1277372 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2000)
(claims for waste, mismanagement, and self-dealing are derivative in nature and not
direct claims).
124
See id. See generally Daniel S. Kleinberger, Direct vs. Derivative Claims in the
Closely Held LLC (outline of speech), ABA Sec. of Bus. L. Comm. Forum 2005 Spring
Meeting).
125
VGS, Inc., 2000 WL 1277372. See also DLLCA, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-1001
(elec. 2007).
126
See CAPROC Manager, Inc. v. Policemen’s & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., No. 1059-N,
2005 WL 937613 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 2005) (holding that, although removal of the manager was not covered by the LLC agreement, an arbitration provision requiring any
dispute or controversy under the LLC agreement to be arbitrated nevertheless applied
because of the broad arbitration clause and because the issue required interpretation of
the LLC agreement).
127
See, e.g., Willie Gary LLC v. James & Jackson LLC, No. 1781, 2006 WL 75309
(Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2006), aff’d, 906 A.2d 76 (Del. 2006).
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flect the use of the LLC format and were updated in 1998 to reflect changes in applicable regulations through the date of Form
5A LLC’s publication. While the tax provisions included in Form 5
and Form 5A preserved the theoretical possibility that the participants could elect not to be taxed as a partnership,128 that possibility is eliminated by use of the LLC entity form.
In the spirit of making minimal changes to the prior forms, the
Modest Form continues the approach, adopted by Form 5 and
continued in Form 5A and Form 5A LLC, of including the tax
provisions as a separate exhibit, rather than integrating them in
the LLC Agreement. The separate exhibit containing the tax provisions is a vestige of the joint venture format and its predecessor
mineral development agreements, that purposely preserved the
parties’ flexibility to elect not to be taxed as a partnership. In
those circumstances in which the tax provisions did not apply, the
exhibit could easily be removed. In the LLC entity context, however, the tax provisions will always apply. While the Modest Form
preserves the approach taken by Form 5A LLC, the committee
should consider integrating the tax provisions into the LLC
Agreement consistent with more common convention for LLC
practitioners.
The tax provisions in Exhibit C to the Modest Form do not incorporate significant changes from Exhibit C to Form 5A LLC. As
discussed above, the Modest Form eliminates the obligation to restore capital account deficits on liquidation.129 The deficit restoration obligation generally is not required in order to give effect to
the desired allocation of income and losses, at least to the extent
that the allocation and distribution provisions do not cause a
130
Member to have a capital account deficit. Based upon the business arrangement, it is unlikely that a Member will have a deficit
capital account balance.131 Further, to the extent that the lack of
a deficit restoration obligation would prevent a Member from be128
Based upon the business transaction posited by the forms, the opportunity to
elect not to be taxed as a partnership was of little practical consequence because, absent the addition of a payout provision, the partnership format was necessary for YCO
to be able to deduct all of the deductible expenses attributable to its cash contributions.
129
See the discussion supra § 13.05[4][c] accompanying notes 117-118.
130
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d) (elec. 2007).
131
See the discussion in Form 5A, Commentary to Exhibit C.
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ing allocated tax deductions in a given year, the Member may be
able to make other arrangements at the time of liquidation in order to preserve the tax deductions.
Exhibit C to the Modest Form continues to reflect a compromise
between the Members’ business deal and their tax objectives. In
most circumstances, the parties’ business intent is probably that
liquidating distributions be made in accordance with percentage
interests. However, the “safe harbor rules” under Internal Revenue Code § 704(b) require that liquidating distributions be made
in accordance with capital account balances, which might not always be in proportion to percentage interests. Consistent with
Form 5A LLC, section 4.2 of Exhibit C to the Modest Form provides that distributions on liquidation of the LLC will be made in
accordance with the Members’ capital account balances. However,
Exhibit C to the Modest Form also includes additional allocation
provisions intended to minimize the risk that capital account balances will not be in accordance with the Members’ percentage interests. Practitioners should consider whether to provide for liquidating distributions in accordance with percentage interests
(consistent with the business deal), rather than in accordance
with capital account balances, recognizing that doing so may have
implications for whether allocations of expenses will be respected
for tax purposes under the “substantial economic effect” rules.132
Exhibit C to the Modest Form also does not change the approach to revaluing the LLC’s assets and adjusting capital account balances on contributions of cash to the LLC, or upon distributions of assets by the LLC. Consistent with Exhibit C to
Form 5A LLC, the Modest Form reserves this issue to the agree133
ment of the Members.
To the extent the committee chooses to incorporate alternative
provisions in an LLC form, it may be desirable to provide alternatives for the provisions relating to liquidating distributions and
revaluing assets, as discussed above. In addition, although the
50/50 deal contemplated by the Modest Form contemplates two
corporate members and does not anticipate the use of employee
incentives, the committee might wish to consider alternative pro132
I.R.C. § 704(b) (elec. 2007); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (elec. 2007).
133
Modest Form Exhibit C § 4.1(h).
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visions permitting the grant of equity incentives in the form of
profits interests.
§ 13.09 Conclusion: Back to the Future?
At the time Form 5A LLC was drafted, it was creative and innovative and based on the best information available at the time.
The authors worked within a mandate to comply as closely as
possible with the terms of Form 5A, a form with little history of
acceptance at the time Form 5A LLC was drafted. In addition, the
authors of Form 5A LLC were constrained by a lack of judicial
precedent regarding LLCs generally, and the recently-overhauled
DLLCA in particular, and by a lack of common conventions for
LLC agreement drafting.
The law and the experience of practitioners have progressed
significantly in the last decade. The Modest Form is truly intended as a modest proposal, an incremental step towards the future
of mining joint ventures, meant to initiate discussion about the
desirability of a broader use of the LLC entity form by cloaking
the new entity in the widely-recognized mining joint venture custom and usage embodied in Form 5. The next and more challenging step is for the Foundation to form a committee to begin the
process again.
The Modest Form may be a good starting point for the next
generation of Form 5, but it may be unnecessarily limited to concepts developed when the common law joint venture was the primary vehicle for joint mining operations. Based on the authors’
experience, the mandate of sticking closely to prior forms will not
necessarily result in a form that is durable and reflective of current practice. Perhaps the next Foundation mining joint venture
form should not slavishly adhere to the language of the past, no
matter how time-tested and widely-accepted, but should also consider other form models and use the appropriate entity law to the
maximum advantage of the parties.
As such, a new form of LLC agreement could begin with a single-agreement, standard form of LLC agreement, organized in a
customary manner, not with a mining joint venture agreement.
The most used and accepted business terms from Form 5 and
Form 5A can be incorporated into the new form in a manner that
takes close account of the fiduciary duty and allocation of liability
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rules applicable to LLCs. The committee should avoid including
provisions that protect the interest of one party or the other, unless such protections are widely accepted as the norm. In the case
in which such protections are sometimes but not consistently
used, such protections should be included as alternate provisions
that accompany the form. Such a structure would be consistent
with the original vision of Form 5 as a “checklist” and starting
point for a customized agreement.
To assist in getting this effort underway, the Modest Form is
posted and downloadable for free from the Foundation’s website
at www.rmmlf.org or available by e-mailing the authors at
jim.cress@hro.com. The authors will receive any comments on the
form and forward them to the Form 5 committee once it is formed.

